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SUITS BY FOREIGN RECEIVERS
STANLEY LAW SABEL t

"Receiverships are always expensive luxuries", was remarked a
few years ago by- one of the leading practitioners in the field of
corporate reorganization.' Courts, too, recognize this and when
possible try to expedite this expensive process. 2 An opportunity
for delay with the corresponding expense and possibility of holdup
is presented in the collection of assets located in more than one
jurisdiction.2 Yet- modem business conditions are such that a
receivership of any size in this country must of necessity involve
assets so located. To formulate in so far as possible the rules applicable to suits by chancery receivers in this situation is the object
4
of this paper.
tMember of New York and Massachusetts Bars.
'Address by Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developnents of the Last Decade, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1931) 133, 163.

2
Palmer v. Bakers' Trust Co., 12F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) cited and
quoted by Swaine, op. cit. supra note I, 165, 166.
An example of the expense specifically involved in an ancillary receivership is
presented in the recent reorganization of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railway where the expenses, other than those in the primary district, totaled
about 2% of the total receivership and reorganization expenses. This is large in
view of the total cost of such reorganization. See Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Railway Receivership Record in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Equity Consolidated Case No. 4931. But
some writers think these expenses insignificant. Lowenthal, The Railroad
Reorganization Act (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv I8, 56.
3The increased expense involved is illustrated by Mabon v. Ongley Electric
Co., i56 N. Y. 196, 5o N. E. 8o5 (1898) where the court refused to appoint an
ancillary receiver because of the expense involved.
The possibility for hold-ups is implicitly recognized by TRACY, CORPORATE
FORECLOSURES, RECEIVERSHIPS AND REORGANIZATIONS (1929) 177, where the
author refers to the necessity for a receiver obtaining instructions from the court
of appointment where the cause of action involved in a foreign jurisdiction is so
small in value as to make it doubtful whether it would be worth the expense of an
ancillary receivership in order to realize thereon.
See Kearns, InterstateReceiverships Practice (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 752.
See 4 POiERoy, EQUITY JURISDICTION (4th ed. 1919) §1669: "Every reason
that would operate... in favor of the recognition of the rights of a foreign corporation would operate with equal force in favor of the recognition of the receiver."
4
The topic dealt with herein has been the subject of extensive classification and
subclassification in a recent article by Laughlin, The ExtraterritorialPower of
Receivers (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 429. The present article does not attempt to
improve upon the classifications presented therein but rather seeks first, to formu-
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Elsewhere we have carefully examined in detail the general
nature of a receiver's rights.5 It is sufficient for our purposes here
to point out that receivers as aids to courts of chancery have long

been an established practice, both in this country and in England.6
In general it may be said that the appointment of a receiver by a
court of equity is made in order to preserve the property or thing
in controversy pending a litigation, and to prevent disintegration
and guard against priorities being obtained, so that the property
may be subject to such decree as the court might render.7
late the principles of law applicable and second, to view these principles in the
light of decided cases.
6in a forthcoming book on RECEIVERSHIPS AND THE LAW; Sabel, Eguity
Jurisdictionin United States Courts witlh Reference to Consent Receiverships-I
(1934) 19 IOWA L. REv. 4o6.

Tor a good discussion of this practise in the federal courts see Underground
Electric Rys. Co. v. Owsley, 176 Fed. 26 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o9); cf Pusey & Jones
Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1922) not allowing a state statute
to extend the receivership "remedy" in thefederal courts.
For the state practise see I CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTISE OF
RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) C. I, and especially p. 13, note 3o citing Katz v. DeWolf,
151 Wis. 337, 138 N. ,W. 1013 (1912) for the proposition: "It is therefore generally
true that courts of general equity jurisdiction with, or without a code, have inherent power to appoint receivers."
Perhaps the earliest English case recognizing the power of the court of chancery
to appoint a receiver is The Duchess of Marlborough v. The Duke of Marlborough, Barnardiston's Reports 69 (174o-i741), the court said that if certain
annuities were not paid it would appoint a receiver to collect them. See I SPENCE,
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY (1846) 673. The power
to appoint receivers was extended to gourts of law by the JUDICATURE ACT OF
1873, 36 & 37 VICT. c. 66.
7
Heffron v. Gage, z49 Ill. 182, 36 N. E. 569 (1894); Keeney v. Home Ins. Co.,
71 N. Y. 396 (1877). To the effect that a receivership is for the purpose of conserving the integrated asset as a common fund see Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S.
348, 53 Sup. Ct. 142 (1932) (however, this case held that a conveyance to a corporation for the purpose of having a receiver appointed over the corporate assets
was a fraudulent conveyance); also note the court's summarization p. 353 of the
usual type of allegations in a creditor's bill: "that the levy of attachments and
executions would ruin the good will and dissipate the assets." Cf. Hollins v.
Brierfield, Coal and Iron Co., 15o U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127 (1893).
Showalter v. Nunnelley Co., 201 Ky. 595, 257 S. W. 1027 (1924) illustrates an
extreme application of preservation of integration. There the court sustained
the appointment of a receiver in a suit to reach an equitable life interest held by an
individual.
Equally broad is Pomeroy's statement of the purpose for the appointment of
the receivers of corporations: "The object of the appointment of a receiver of a
corporation is the preservation of its property for the benefit of persons interested
... " 4POMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1537. For the proposi-

tion that the appointment of a receiver is theoretically incidental to the court's
main task in a given litigation see United States v. McCutchen, 234 Fed. 702,715
(S. D. Cal. 1915).
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We are here primarily concerned with receivers appointed by
courts of equity rather than those appointed by administrative
authorities such as under the National Bank or Farm Loan Acts.8
Likewise we are primarily concerned with such chancery receivers
exercising powers derived from the order of the court appointing
them rather than those vested in them by statute. 9
The most important thing to be noticed about a chancery receivership for our purposes is that it does not affect the title to the property
to which it relates.' 0 Thus, a chancery receiver gets no title but
only a right to have the possession of the property as an officer
of the court." This has generally been the holding of modern cases
considering this problem.y 2 The same thing is true in the case of
chancery receivers for corporations. 3
If, then, title to specific property is not changed, by the appoint8

See Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 498 (1869); Fifer v. Williams, 5 F.
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927) (receiver of a national bank appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency); Krauthoff v. Kansas City Joint-Stock Land Bank, 23 F.
(2d) 71 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) (receiver under Farm Loan Act appointed by Federal
Farm Loan Board); Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 618.
'See cases cited in notes 27 and 29, infra.
' 0Keeney v. Home Ins. Co., supranote 7 (holding that a chancery receivership
is not a change of title within the meaning of a condition in an insurance policy
against change of title); Southern Plants Co. v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 159
N. C. 78, 74 S. E. 812 (1912) semble; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 91 Va.
305, 21 S. E. 476 (1895) semble; Note (191o) I6 Ann. Cas. 869; cf. Thompson v.
Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287, 10 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1889) (holding that a change
of a receiver is not a change of title or possession).
U14POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1336.
"Federal rule is stated in text: Board of Drainage Commrs. v. Lafayette South
Side Bank of St. Louis, 27 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); Irving Trust Co. v.
Spruce Apartments, 44 F. (2d) 218 (D. C. Pa. 1930); Michigan Trust Co. v.
People of Michigan, 52 F. (2d) 842, (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Nicholson v. Western
Loan & Bldg. Co., 6oF. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
Recent state cases holding title to be the same as before the receivership and
that the receiver gets possession: McCarthy v. Cutchall, 2o9 Iowa 193,225 N. W.
865 (1929); Burr v. Wentworth, 202 Ill. App. 13 (196); Anderson v. Macek,
(2d) 286

350 Ill. 135,
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N. E. 745 (I932); Scranton Button Co. v. Neonlite Corp. of

America, io5 N. J. Eq. 7o8, 149 Atl. 369 (xg3o); Lathers v. Hamlin, 102 Misc.
563, 17o N. Y. Supp. 98 (I918); Jacobs v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 132 Misc.
144, 228 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1928); Bateman v. Brown, 297 S. W. 773 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927); Underhill v. Rutland R. Co., go Vt. 462,98 Atl. 1017 (igi6); Clifford
v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103 Vt. 229, 153 Atl. 205 (193).
"Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 203 (1872); U. S. Trust Co. v. New York
Street Ry. Co., io N. Y. 478,5 N. E. 316 (1886); In re Victoria Steamboats Ltd.,
I Ch. D. I58, 66 L. J. (Ch.) 21, (1897). But it has been held by at least one
court that it had no inherent power to appoint receivers for a corporation. Baker
v. Louisiana Portable R. R. Co., 34 La. Ann. 754 (1882).
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merit of a receiver, it must remain in the original owners. 14 This
is because the personality of the original owner, who for want of
a better term we can designate, as receivee, continues, for under
the common law title can only vest in a legal person. 5 The receivee
thus has the power of being a legal actor 16 except in so far as this
power is,limited by the power of the court over him.' 7 The receivership order or decree is usually accompanied by a direction to the
141 am purposely excluding here what Pomeroy calls the first class of cases in
which a receiver will be appointed, viz. "where there is no person entitled to the
property who is at the same time competent to hold and manage it during the
judicial proceeding." 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1332.
Under this class Pomeroy includes receivers over infants, lunatics and decedents'
estates. In that guardians, committees and executors or administrators are the
usual persons to handle such estates today, POMEROY, ibid., and in that the power
of these special representatives have been greatly extended by statute, POMEROY,
ibid., thus doing away to a great extent with the necessity of a receiver in such
cases, it is believed that these special cases can be safely disregarded in a general
discussion of receiverships. At any rate, the interstate problems are different as
to these special individuals, see Beale, Voluntary Paymentto a ForeignAdministrator (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 597, and probably different in regard to receivers of
such estates.
' 5 This seems implicit in certain jurisprudential writings: see 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1885) 886 et seq.; POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1923) 176, 177, also PART I chs. V, VII; LITLETON'S
TENURES § I. A concrete illustration of this is presented in the cases holding
that a partnership cannot take title in its firm name. Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn.
201 (1879); Moreau v. Saffarans, 3 Sneed 595 (Tenn. z856); see 3 WASHBURN,
TREATISE ON AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1876) 267.
' 6Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown, 171 N. Y. 488, 64 N, E. 194 (1902) holding that
a foreign corporation in receivership "had legal capacity to sue" and allowing the
suit so brought to continue after the appointment of an ancillary receiver. Of
course, the receivee may be enjoined from prosecuting suits. 4 POMEROY, EQuITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. igig) §1613.
"This power of the court is not always fully exercised: Chicago Deposit Vault
Co. v. McNulta, 153 U. S. 554, 14 Sup. Ct. 915 (1893); Lehigh Coal and Naviga-

tion Co. v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 35 N. J. Eq. 426 (1882). On the other
hand, the power of the court of appointment is itself limited: Kain v. Smith, 8o
N. Y. 458 (188o). These limitations indicate that the receivee ceases to be a
"legal actor" only in so far as a court which has jurisdiction over him has exercised
its power. Too, a person enjoined oftentimes has the legal power of disobeying
the injunction and by so doing creating rights in another. Winston v. Westfeldt,
22 Ala. 760 (1853).

An alternative line of reasoning to the effect that a court might even be able
to increase the receivee's capacity, if necessary, is suggested by the recent case
of In Re Clinton 41 F. (2d) 749 (S.D. Cal. 1930). (Holding that an insane person
could become an involuntary bankrupt where the state court had authorized his
petition). There seems to be no justification for limiting the reasoning of this
case to persons not suijuris.
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receiver to get in certain or all property of the receivee; 8 and enjoins
both the receivee and third persons interfering with the receiver
so doing.'9 In obeying this mandate, the receiver is acting for a
legal person20 under the direction of a court which, as we are con21
sidering the problem, had jurisdiction over this person. From this,
it is submitted, that when a court enjoins the receivee interfering
with the receiver getting in the propertyO this injunction would
have the affect as between the receiver and the receivee of giving
the receiver a power of attorney to sue in the name of the receivee.Y
How far another state will recognize this power vested in the receiver
is a matter of the other state's conflicts of laws.24
' 8 Where a receiver is appointed for some special purpose, as the collection of
rents, he is not ordered to take possession of the receivee's property generally.
Wardlaw v. Herrington, 125 Ga. 828, 54 S. B. 699 (igo6). In the usual case,
however, the receiver is directed to reduce to his possessions the property and
assets of the receivee. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co.,
282 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), appeal dismissed, 262 U. S. 736,43 Sup. Ct. 704
(1923) memo.; Johnson v. Emerson Phonograph Co., 296 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924); Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273 Pac. 933 (1929); Platt v. N. Y. & Sea
Beach Ry. Co., 17o N.Y. 451, 63 N. E. 532 (1902). Still, it is a matter of judicial
discretion how much property the receiver will be ordered to get in, and in some
cases the receiver himself is given discretion as to this. Adams v. Elwood, 1o4
App. Div. 138,93 N. Y. Supp. 327 (I905).
9
1 An affirmative injunction is illustrated by an order to the receiver to sell
perishables upon which a lien existed free from such encumbrance. Harned v.
Rowand, 74 N. J. Eq. 264, 69 Atl. 18i (I9O8). More often the order appointing
a receiver has the effect of an injunction against the receivee and third persons
interfering with the receiver's possession. Bowker v. Haight & Freese Co., 146
Fed. 257 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 19o6); Delozierv. Bird, 123 N. C. 689,3i S.E.834
(1898). The injunctive effect of such an order as to creditors subject to the
jurisdiction of the court will be recognized by the courts of another state.
2OSupra note I6.
Gilman v. Ketcham, 84Wis. 6o,54 N. W. 395 (1893).
2
This is a self-imposed limitation on the scope of this paper. We are concerned
with interstate powers of a receiver, which of course must be derived chiefly from
personal jurisdiction over the receivee. See CoNFLICTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L.
Inst. 1930) §100.
If, however, the property alone is within the jdrisdiction of the court, a receiver may be appointed for that property. I CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, §626.
The interstate problems possible in such a case would seem in their most difficult
aspect to involve only a protection of possession. Semble, infra p. ooo, note 26.
Thus we can confine our attention to cases where the court has jurisdiction over
2Supra notes 18 and 19.
the receivee.
"3 An analogous situation exists in the case of incompetent persons where the
court can bestow the power of managing their property upon another. Lloyd
v. Kirkwood, 112 Ill. 329 (1884) (infants); Light v. Light, 25 Beav. 248, 53 Eng.
Rep. 631 (1858) (lunatics).
2See definition of conflict of laws in CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1930) §i and especially comment a thereto.
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Before proceeding to view these tentative conclusions in the light
of the decided cases, it may be well to mention certain other situations in which a receiver can bring suit in a foreign jurisdiction,
but which are fitted by the courts more readily into the legal picture.
In all these cases the receiver acquires a cause of action apart
from the order of the court appointing him, and is almost universally
allowed to enforce such causes of action in the courts of a foreign
state. As these classes of cases are referred to here in order to differentiate them from the more controversial problem herein under
discussion, it should be sufficient for our purposes merely to enumerate the general classes. First, there are the cases in which the
receiver enters into legal transactions in relation to property held
by him as receiver and brings suit on causes of actions arising out
of such transactions, 2 as, for example, upon a contract made by
him as receiver. Second, there are the cases in which a receiver
brings suit founded upon a valid possessory right,2 as, for example,
against one who wrongfully takes property out of his possession.
Third, there are the cases in which a receiver sues upon a cause of
action which is vested in him by statute, 27 as, for example, under
nWilkinsonv. Culver, 25 Fed. 639 (C. C.S. D. N.Y. 1885); (suitona judgment);
Iglehart v. Bierce, 36 Ill. 133 (1864) (suit on a mortgage); Merchants' National
Bank of Boston v. Pa. Steel Co., 57 N. J. L. 336, 3o Atl. 545 (1894) (suit on a
contract made by a receiver). So, too, a receiver has been allowed to sue in a
foreign jurisdiction on a contract made by the receivee where the performance
on the plaintiff's side was by the receiver. Cooke v. Town of Orange, 48 Conn.
4O (188o).

"Whatever be the theory on which the American courts say the acts and obligations of a receiver are in a sense the acts and obligations of a court, nevertheless
when the receiver acts he acts and when the receiver incurs obligations he incurs
obligations and therefore in relation to such acts and obligations should be allowed to sue in a foreign jurisdiction." I CLARK Op. cit. supra note 6, §294 citing
Chicago Bonding & Surety Co. v. United States, 261 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 7th,
1919).
2

6Oakes v. Lake, 290 U. S. 59, 54 Sup. Ct. 13 (I933); Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn.
(1877); Jenkins v. Purcell, 29 App. D. C. 209, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074 (1907);
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Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Keokuk No. Line Packet Co., io8 Ill.
317 (1883); Robertson v. Stead, 135 Mo. 135, 36 S. W. 61o (1896); Osgood v.
Maguire, 6i N. Y. 524 (1875); Woodhull v. Farmers' Trust Co., ii N. D. I57,
9o N. W. 795 (1902); Cagill v. Wooldridge, 8 Bax. 58o (Tenn. 1876). Contra:
Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal. 551, 22 Pac. 892 (1889) (vigorous dissenting
opinions).
27Bernheimer v. Converse, 2o6 U. S. 516, 27 Sup. Ct. 755 (1907); Converse v.
Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (i9ii); Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. 747
(C. C. A. ist, I899); Goss v. Carter, 156 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 5th, 1907); Irvine v.
Baker, 225 Fed. 834 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Bullock v. Oliver, 155 Ga. I5I, II6 S. B.
293 (1923);

Hirning v. Hamlin, 200 Iowa

I322,206

N. W. 617 (1925); Howarth v.
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;k statute providing that stockholders' subscription calls or double
liability as the case may be run directly to a receiver. Fourth,there,
are cases in which the receiver sues (either in his own name or in that
of his assignee, according to the law of the particular state where
suit is brought as to such suits on assignments) upon rights acquired by him through voluntary assignment from the receivee,28
as, for example, upon a contract assigned to him. Fifth, there
are cases in which the receiver brings suit founded upon title to
personal property of a corporation which is transferred to him by
statute upon dissolution of -the corporation by the state which
created it,2 " as, for example, under a statute which vests the personal property of an insolvent insurance company in the commissioner of insurance.
In all these situations, as already stated, the receiver is almost
universally allowed to sue in the courts of another state. The
leading cases are collected in the notes to the respective classes.
In every one of these classes of cases thereceiver has, either through
Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. B. 888 (igoo); Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179,
56 N. E. 489 (i9oo); Shipman v. Treadwell, 2o8 N..Y. 404, IO2 N. B. 634 (1913).
For a recent case with a good discussion of this problem see: Luikhart v. Spurck,
I F. Supp. 53 (S. D. Ill. 1932).
This statutory vesting of a cause of action seems similar to the vesting of
causes of action under LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT and kindred legislation under
which statutes it is held that the statutory designee may sue in any state. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cutter, I6 Kan. 568 (1876).
28
Ward v. Conn. Pipe Mfg. Co., 71 Conn, 345,41 Atl. 1057 (1899); cf. Zacher v.
Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., IO6 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 6th, igoi), certiorari
denied, I8I U. S. 621, 21 Sup. Ct. 924 (19OI).
As to whether such assignment is voluntary or involuntary this is but one
aspect of the broader problem of the voluntary or involuntary character of a
general assignment for the benefit of creditors. See Sunderland, Foreign Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors (1903) 2 Micn. L. Rav. 112, 180.
29
Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (i88O); Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co.,
31 Fed. 305 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1887); Hopkins v. Lancaster, 254 Fed. igo
(N. D. Ala. 1918); Martyne v. Amer. Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. Y. 183, i1o
N. E. 502 (I915); Bockover v. Life Assn. of Am., 77 Va. 85 (1883). But cf.
Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577 (1862).
This is explained by the control which the state of incorporation has over the
corporation. Relfe v. Rundle, supra. This doctrine is commonly worded so
as to apply only to personal property. See CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L.
Inst. 1930) §17o. This limitation probably goes back to the control which the
state of situshas over immoveables. See Watkins v. Holman, I6 Pet. (U.S.) 157
(1842). Yet it seems that in the last analysis the state of situs has an equal control over immoveables. See Beale, Living Trusts of Moveables in the Conflict of
Laws (1932) 45 HAav. L. REv. 969. But this is not always apparent to courts
and the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is often applied. STORY, CONFLICT
or LAWS (8th ed. Bigelow 1883) §378.
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statute,3° his own act,3' or an act of the receivee,2 something more

than the rights conferred by the order of his appointment; it is only
necessary to state these added rights to see the soundness of these
decisions.
To return, then, to our main thesis. The situation that gives the
courts their greatest difficulty is that in which a chancery receiver,
who, as we have seen, has merely a right of possession of the debtor's
assets as an officer of the court appointing him," brings suit without
any additional right or authority in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to collect chattels or chose in action belonging to the receivee.
Such a problem was before the court in the leading case of Booth v.
Clark.34 In that case a chancery receiver appointedupon a creditor's
bill in a NewYork state court brought suit in the circuit court of the
District of Columbia to recover certain funds awarded to Clark by
commissioners under the Mexican Treaty upon claims accruing
anterior to the plaintiff's appointment as receiver. The case finally
came before the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Court
held that a receiver could not sue in the Courts of a foreign jurisdiction merely because of the order of a Court elsewhere which
appointed him, in the absence of some conveyance or statute vesting
property in him.
This case has settled the law in the United States courts as to the
extraterritorial powers of a chancery receiver. It has been followed
by a long line of decisions. 5 In its most recent adjudication on this
3

OThe rights mentioned under classes three and five are of course statutory and,
at least in relation to these rights, the receiver cannot be said to be a chancery
31
nClass four.
Classes one and two.
receiver.
3I7 How. (U. S.) 322 (1854).
33Supra notes ii and 12.
2
5Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244 (1902); Great Western Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 25 Sup. Ct. 770 (1905); Keatley v. Furey,
226

U. S. 399, 33 Sup. Ct.

121 (1912);

Sterrett v. Second Nat. Bank, 248 U. S.

73,39 Sup.Ct. 27 (1918); Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct.
480 (1922); Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., io6 Fed. 593 (C. C. A.
6th, I9oi), certioraridenied181 U.S. 621,21 Sup. Ct. 924 (igoi); Lewisv.American
Naval Stores Co., i19 Fed. 391 (C. C. E. D. La. 19o2); see Strout v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., x95 Fed. 313, 319 (D. C. Mass. -1912); Coal and Iron R. R. Co. v.
Reherd, 2o4 Fed. 859,881 (C. C. A., 4 th, 1913); Aschraft v.Brean, 51 F. (2d) 301,
302 (M. D. Pa. 1931). See also Bay State Gas Co. v. Rogers, 147 Fed. 557, 559
(C. C. Mass. 19o6) where thesuit was broughtin thereceivee's nameand where, although there was an ancillary receiver appointed at the forum, the court said:,
"...this suit could not havebeen brought ormaintained in the name of the corporation by Pepper simply by virtue of the power vested in him by the Circuit
Court for the District of Delaware" (this dictum should be compared with the
quotation in the text page 45o from Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris).
Cf. In re Bankshares Corp., 5o F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) where the court
refused to allow foreign receiver to intervene in bankruptcy, and refused to apply
the usual equity rule noted infra,note 58.
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topic, Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 6 the Supreme Court said:
"Since the decision of this court in Booth v. Clark it is the
settled doctrine in federal jurisprudence that a chancery receiver has no authority to sue in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to recover demands or property therein situated. The
functions and authority of such receiver are confined to the
jurisdiction in which he was appointed."
In so far as these cases hold that a chancery receiver has only
such right to possession as the court appointing him can give there
is no room to quarrel with their holdings. That this is precisely
the holding of the majority of these cases can be seen from the
fact that in all but one of the Supreme Court cases dealing with
37
this problem the receiver was attempting to sue in his own name.
That a chancery receiver is vested with no cause of action or right
to property by the mere order of his appointment is apparent from
our previous discussion.3 8 However, we have seen that as between
the parties the order appointing a receiver vests him with at least
the power to manage the receivee's suit; 9 there is nothing (unless
contained in the order of appointment) to prevent the receivee
suing in a foreign state.40 That such a suit could be maintained by
the receivee though handled by the receiver was denied by the
Supreme Court of the United States unanimously in Great Western
4
and Mining Mfg. Co., by L. C. Block, its receiver, v. Harris.
1 In that
case suit was brought by the receiver to recover damages from the
estate of a deceased director alleged to have been caused by the
director's mismanagement and misappropriation of certain funds
belonging to the company. The court on certiorariaffirmed the dismissal of the bill on the authority of Booth v. Clark and said of the
contention that the receiver was authorized to institute the action
in the name of the corporation that no express authorization had been
shown and thus the Court said:
"Nor do we think the jurisdiction is established because the
action is authorized to be instituted by the receiver in the name
of the corporation. Such action subjecting local assets to a
foreign jurisdiction and to a foreign receivership would come
within the reasoning of Booth v. Clark. If a recovery be had,
although in the name of the corporation, the property will be
turned over to the receiver, to be by him administered under
the order of the court appointing him."
3Supra note 35, at 76, 39 Sup. Ct. at 28.
37
See cases note 35, supra. Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris cited
therein is the case in which the receiver sued in the name of the receivee.
38
See note IO, supra.
"Page 446, supra and see also note 23.
40
Ibid.
U'Supra note 35, at 577, 25 Sup. Ct. at 775.
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The reasoning of the Court is not altogether clear. Recovery in
the name of the receivee would at least vest legal title in him2 and
the receiver has been given the power to manage the suit. In reality
it seems that the Court is so imbued with the doctrine of Booth v.
Clark that it cannot allow a suit to be managed by one whom it will
not allow to sue. It is hard to see how the debtor who is in fact
sued by his. creditor can object. Nevertheless, this case must be
taken as settling the law for the federal courts; the situation is
now one that can probably only be changed through statute.4
There however remains under the federal rule the possibility that
if the receivee had authorized the suit the receiver would be allowed
to manage it." Such authorization should not be difficult to obtain
45
in cases where the receivership is in fact consensual.
Fortunately, the federal cases just disposed of do not settle the
42 See note io, supra.
' 3The present statutes apply to "property in different districts in the same
state." 36 STAT. 1102 (I9I1), 28 U. S. C. §116 (1926) and "property in different
states in same circuit" 36 STAT. 1102 (19ip), 28 U. S. C. §117 (1927). These
statutes apply to contiguous property such as railroads. However, there would
seem to be no inherent objection to allowing a federal receiver to sue at least in
any federal court. The new §77 of the BANKRUPTCY AcT, 47 STAT. 1474 (1933),
28 U. S. C. Supp. VII, §205 (1933) does away with ancillary receiverships for
reorganizations of railways thereunder. See Lowenthal, The RailroadReorganizalion Act (i933) 47 HARv. L. REv. I8, 56. There is now pending a bill dealing
with reorganizations of other than railroad companies and patterned after §77
of the BANKRUPTCY AcT and which would therefore apparently do away further
with ancillary receiverships in the case of proceedings brought thereunder. H.
R. No. 5884 which was passed by the House and referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee June 6, 1933. See Lowenthal, supra at p. 22. Kearns, supra note 3,
at 765, suggests two possible alternative amendments to the present Federal law, to
provide for appointment of primary receivers as ancillary receivers except upon
objection by an interested party or to amend Section 56 of the Judicial Code, 36
STAT. 1102 (IgI I), 28 U. S. C. 117 (1926),to provide for nation-wide receivership.
The first seems but a restatement of what has long been the prevailing practice.
See Byrne, The Foreclosureof RailroadMortgagesin the United States Courtsin SoME
LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION
(1917) 77, 89 et seg. The second would probably be construed sinilarily, to the
construction of the section as it now stands in Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v.
Karatz, supra note 14, at p. 87, to only include integral properties of a physical
nature. It is doubtful if a change, even of this latter type, and even if these
objections were not so, could be practically done without providing for some sort
of local administration. See pending House of Representatives' Bill, supra,for a
more practical solution.
41See quotation from Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, supra page
450 of the text.
45For example of how closely the corporate receivee often works with the receiver see Swaine, op. cit. supranote I, p. 179.
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problem. It is only when the requisite basis of federal jurisdiction
exists that a case can get into the federal courts. 46 Diversity of
citizenship exists in practically all the cases involving interstate
suits by receivers and would probably exist in a large majority of
the cases where the action is in the name of the receivee.47 However,
the requisite three thousand dollar monetary requirement of such
suits must be present in order to get into the federal courts through
diversity of citizenship, directly or by removal. 4 It is in the smaller
claims, which cannot be brought in or removed to the federal courts,
that the expense, confusion and delay of ancillary proceedings
are all out of proportion to the amount of the claim involved. It
49
is here that economic arguments would have their fullest force.
That is, it is economically absurd to require the appointment of
an ancillary receiver for the very purpose of properly preserving
the assets of the receivee in cases where this requirement would
impose a greater burden than the particular assets located in a
foreign state are worth. This requirement in such a case would
seem to give the person who had assets of or owed debts to the
receivee a weapon of defense entirely apart from anything that
concerns him. A valid release is all that he is entitled to demand.
An ancillary receivership may have some justification where the
problem is complicated by the very largeness of the amount of
money involved. But where the amount is small, should this be
necessary, at least where there are no competing interests?
That is the problem that has often confronted state courts. Yet
the prestige of the Court that decided Booth v. Clark is such and the
logic of the opinion so strong 0 that the state courts have generally
refused to allow a foreign chancery receiver to sue as a matter of
4

6RosE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS (4th ed.
I93i) §9 and Chs. IX: "Diversity of Citizenship" and XIII: "Removal of Cases
from State to Federal Courts."
47The special problems raised in connection with federal jurisdiction cannot
be disposed of here. Very intricate problems in this field may have incidental
bearing on our problem such as that presented in the case of corporations incorporated under the laws of more than one state. See ROSE, id. §272.
48See note 46, supra.
4'GoODRICH, HANDBOOK CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 443, says: "...it is very con-

venient for the receiver and the interests of the persons whom he represents, if he
may sue in another state. It saves time; it saves expense of another receivership
with its necessary formality of appointment, accounting, and so on ."
50
"That the court cannot send its marshal or sheriff outside of its jurisdiction
to seize property cannot disputed. Upon the same principle, it can send no other
officer or agent to collect money outside of its territorial limits." 17 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (revised and permanent ed. 1933) §8567.
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right in his own name on causes of action belonging to the receivee5 1
In most of these cases the courts lay down a rule that will not allow
a receiver to sue in a foreign state where the rights of local creditors
are involved. 2 In other cases the suit was brought in the name
of the receiver in states which had no real party in interest statutes
at the time. 3 Only one case can be found in which the refusal
to allow suit was not based upon the presence of local creditors
or in which the suit was not brought in the receiver's name in a
state that had no real party in interest statute." If these cases
not allowing a foreign receiver to sue present the only alternative
to the economically expedient rule suggested above, we have a
conflict between logic and policy.
In general, policy has prevailed. That is, a foreign chancery
receiver is generally allowed to sue if domestic creditors are not
prejudiced thereby.5" Here the cases fall into the converse pattern
from that presented in the cases just referred to where the receiver
was not allowed to sue. In none of these cases allowing suit were
local creditors involved." In most of them the suit was brought
in the name of the receivee 57 or if brought in the name of the re51

Ward v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 135 Cal. 235, 67 Pac. 124 (191o);
Stockbridge v. Beckwith, 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 Atl. 620 (1887); Catlin v. Wilcox
Silver-Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. 250 (189o); Wyman v. Eaton, 107 Iowa
224, 77 N. W. 865 (1899); Homer v. Barr Pumping Engine Co., 18o Mass. 163,
61 N. E. 883 (igol); Filkins v. Nunnemacher, 81 Wis. gi, 5I N. W. 79 (1892);
Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Bums, 17 Ga. App. I, 86 S. E. 270 (I915); see Ho]brook v. Ford, r53 Ill. 633, 39 N. E. iO9i (1894); So. Building & Loan Assn. v.
Price, 88 Md. 155, 41 Atl. 53 (1898); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Broadway
Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 138 Misc. I6, 245 N. Y. Supp. 2 (1930); Van Tuyl v.
Carpenter, 135 Tenn. 629, 188 S. W. 234 (1916).
62This is so as to all cases cited in note 51, supra except Homer v. Barr Pumping
Engine Co., and Filkins v. Nunnemacher.
53
Stockbridge v. Beckwith, supra note 51; Homer v. Barr Pumping Engine
Co., supra note 51.
5'Filkins v. Nunnemacher, supra note 51.
5
' Barley v. Gittings, 15 App. Cases D. C. 427 (i8gg); Richardson v. So. Florida
Mort. Co., 102 Fla. 313, 136 So. 393 (1931); Metzner v. Bauer, 98 Ind. 425

(1884); Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. use of Beeber, Receiver v. Langley, 62 Md. 196
(1884); Comstock v. Frederickson, 51 Minn. 350, 53 N. W. 723 (1892); Bodge v.
Skinner Packing Co., 15 Neb. 41, 211 N. W. 203 (1926); Hurd v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. I (1879); Stone v. Penn Yan, Keuka Park & Brancliport Ry.,
197 N. Y. 279, 90 N. E. 843 (I9IO); Van Kempen v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, I6O
S. E. 759 (1931); Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 (1882); Hardee v. Wilson,
129 Tenn. 5II, 167 S. W. 475 (1914); Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt.
526 (2883).
'6See cases noted in 55, supra.
57
Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Langley, supra note 55; Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v.
Wright, supranote 55.
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ceiver, there existed a real party in interest statute,"8 although a
few courts in their zeal to adopt what appeared to them to be a
sensible rule seem to have allowed the suit in the receiver's name
without such a statute. 9 These cases are usually referred to as
announcing a doctrine based upon comity, 60 but that word does
little to clarify the picture. Who are domestic creditors is a
question which has received various interpretations 61 and is beyond
the scope of this paper. In general it may be said that their interest
in an ancillary proceeding may outweigh the interest in a quick and
62
inexpensive collection of assets by the receiver.
Do these cases, which by and large reach a just result, do violence
to the logic of the situation? It is submitted that they do not and
that their result can generally be explained by the contention which
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Great Western Mining and
Mfg. Co. v. Harris that the receiver has the power to sue for the
receivee in a foreign state bringing the suit in the name of the receivee. We have seen that on theory this logically follows from the
58
Richardson v. So. Florida Mort. Co., supra note 55; Metzner v. Bauer, supra
note 55; Comstock v. Frederickson, supranote 55; Bodge v. Skinner Packing Co.,
supra note 55; Stone v. Penn Yan, Keuka Park & Branchport Ry., supra note
55; Van Kempen v. Latham, supra note 55; Bank v. McLeod, supra note 55.
Where the foreign receiver sues in equity the court will usually allow the suit
to be brought in the receiver's own name. Boulware v. Davis, 9o Ala. 207, 8 So.
84 (18go) (suit to foreclose a mortgage); Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585 (N. Y.
1859) (action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance); Bidlack v. Mason, 26 N. J.
Eq. 230 (1875) (suit to recover property taken from the state by fraud). These
cases offer no real difficulty; it has been said that the principle embodied in the
real party in interest statutes is that which always existed in equity. Field v.
Maghee, 5 Paige 539 (N. Y. 1836); see FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIOINERS
ON PLEADING AND PRACTISE IN NEW YORK

(1848)

123-125.

'

"Barley v. Gittings; supranote 55; Hurd v. City of Elizabeth, supra note 55;
Hardee v. Wilson, supranote 55.
"0See note 55 supra.
6
For a good general statement of the rule of comity and its exceptions see
Hardee v. Wilson, supra note 55. However, even where there is an ancillary receivership local creditors will not be preferred in the final distribution in the absence of a specific lien or trust fund provided for their protection. People v.
Granite State Provident Assn., 161 N. Y. 492, 55 N. E. 1053 (I900); Brunner v.
York Bridge Co., 78 W. Va. 702, 9o S. E. 233 (I916).
The privilege of suing in jurisdictions other than their appointment is almost
universally conceded to receivers, now, as a matter of comity or courtesy, unless
such a suit is inimical to the interests of local creditors, or to the interests of those
who have acquired rights under a local statute or unless such a suit is in contravention to the policy of the forum. See GOODRICH, HANDBOOK, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1927) 443, 444.
2

But see Hardee v. Wilson, supra note 55 and GOODRICH, ibid.
3See discussion of this case p. 450 of the text supra, et seg.

6
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control which the court appointing the receiver has over the receivee.6 The applicability of this doctrine even to cases where
suit is allowed in the name of the rece ver can be worked out from the
fact that most of the states where such cases are found require
suits to be brought in the name of the real party in interest.65
Many states have these statutes requiring actions to be brought
by the real party in interest.66 Although in the absence of such
statutes it is generally held that a chancery receiver cannot sue
in his own name on causes of actions belonging to the ieceivee, 67
it has been held that under these statutes such suits may be brought
in the receiver's own name."' This requirement is obviously procedural in nature6 9 and the law of the forum would apply thereto."
Thus it would seem that in regard to such suits by foreign receivers
these statutes must be complied with.7 ' In the states in which these
"See pp. 446 and 450 of the text, supra.

"See note 58, supra.
CODE (Michie, 1928) §5699 (except suits on "Commercial" instruments); ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §3737; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) §1o89; CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) §367; COLO. CoMP.
LAWS (1921) §3; FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) §42O1; IDAHO CODE (1932) §5-301; IND.
ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) §2-201; IOWA CODE (1931) §10967; KAN. REV. STAT.
ANN. (1923) C. 6o, §401; KY. CODES ANN. (Carroll, 1932) Civil Prac. §18; LA.
CODE OF PRAC. (Dart, 1932) §15 ("one having a real and actual interest");
MICH. CoMp. LAws (1929) §14010; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9165, Mo.
STAT. ANN. (1932) §698; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, I92i) §9067; NEB. CoMp.
STAT. (1929) §20-301; NEv. CoMp. LAWS (Hllyer, 1929) §8543; N. Y. Civ. PRAc.
ACT (1920) §210; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §446; N. D. Come.LAws Ann.
(1913) §7395; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) §11241; OKLA. STAT. (I931) §142;
6ALA.

ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §1-301; S. C. Code (1932) §397; S. D. CoMp. LAWS
(1929) §2306; UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) §104-3-I; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington,
1932) §179; WIs. STAT. (1931) §260.13; Wyo. REV. STAT. (193) §89-501-.

'I CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, §587; see Underhill v. Rutland R. R. Co., 90
Vt. 462, 467, 98 Atl. 1017, l18 (1916): "It is an established principal of the
common law, and a settled doctrine of this state, that an action in a court of law
for the enforcement of a right must be in the name of the person having legal
title... No exception exists at common law in favor of a receiver, and we have
no statute creating one."
6
'n Leonardv. Storrs, 31 Ala. 488, 491 (1858) the court referredto the fact that
legal title to the note upon which suit was brought was in another, but allowed

suit in the receiver's name saying: "We hold that he was the party really interested, within the meaning of section 2129 of the Code, and that the action was
properly brought in his name." Richardson v. So. Fla; Mort. Co., IO2 Fla. 313,
136 So. 393 (193r); Henning v. Raymond, 35 Minn. 303,29 N. W. 132 (I886).
0
" CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I931) §637.
0
7 CONFLIcTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931) §612.
71
See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Clair, 36 Hun 362 (1885), a d. 107
N. Y. 663, 14 N. E. 414 (1887): "The statute of New Jersey authorizing the
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real party in interest statutes have been adopted 2 they should
obviate the difficulties we have been considering. In these states
the receiver managing the receivee's suits, in so far as this is allowed, 73 could do so in his own name. Thus these statutes offer a
rationale through which the rule of policy can be made into one of
logic as well.
So worked out the results are not difficult to formulate:
I. A chancery receiver, without additional rights:
A. Can never sue in the federal courts.
B. Cannot sue even in the state courts where the rights of
local creditors are involved.
C. Where the rights of local creditors are not involved
i. May sue in the state courts in the receivee's name
where there is no real party in interest statute.
2. May sue in the state courts in his own name where
there is such a statute.
Whether all this classification represents a tendency towards a
more general recognition of a foreign receiver,74 or whether these
distinctions are the ultimate ones in this field, it is perhaps too early
to predict. Whether a given case represents the utmost extent to
which the law will go on the one hand, or a growing tendency in
the law on the other, depends perhaps upon what one thinks of the
case. Thus when the present writer says that we have here an
illustration of a growing tendency, he is simply stating his opinion
75
of what he believes to be desirable.
receiver to bring an action in his own name or otherwisehasno extraterritorial
force. The lexfori governs as to the manner of commencing actions, and a claim
presented by a foreign creditor to our courts for consideration must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, for the reason that our statute so declares, its language being 'every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
party in interest.' "(sic).
7
ISee note 66, supra.
731.e. subject to the limitation as to local creditors, p. 453 of the text, supra.
74
Such a tendency is illustrated by the cases referred to in note 59, supra;
see Loughlin, supra note 4.
7
6Where the question is one of recognizing a foreign created right there would
seem to be more room for considering the desirability of a particular rule in a
given case than when it involves a choice of one of two possible laws. See Cavers,
-A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARv.L. Rav. 173.

